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IN DENIAL: THE ROLE OF LAW IN
PREPARING FOR DEATH

Barbara A. Noah
Only approximately 20% of Americans have engaged in any form of advance care
planning and, even among older Americans, the process frequently is delayed until an
acute illness provides sufficient pressure to act. End of life law, though flawed, offers
some opportunity to express individual values and preferences via advance directives
of various kinds in order to prepare for death before it is imminent. Yet many people
avoid making these preparations because the thought of death is uncomfortable to
confront. This Article considers the utility of existing law in preventing and
resolving end of life disputes and avoiding over-utilization of life-prolonging
technology and the law's inevitable failure to address complex issues concerning
quality of life and communication about this inevitable but usually unpredictable
event.

The so-called technological imperative and the cultural admiration of those who
"fight" and "do everything" to defeat illness have created an atmosphere in which
physicians and patients often feel complementarily reluctant to engage in thoughtful
discussions about the patient's values, preferences, and concerns or, worse, even to
acknowledge openly the fact of the patient's dying. In addition, the presumption in
favor of continued treatment for patients who have lost decisional capacity has created
a situation in which patients are frequently subjected to multiple therapeutic and life
supportive technologies that they would not wish for if they could make the choice.
This lacuna of unconsidered choices suggests a significant need for formal expressions
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of end of life preferences, or at least serious conversation with family and health care
providers about one's preferences. The law allows individuals to express their
preferences on these matters, but creates little incentive to do so.

As other commentators have noted, advance directives rarely resolve end of life
disputes-these commentators have therefore suggested abandoning efforts to
encourage the utilization of advance directives. There is, however, a compelling
argument in favor of continuing and expanding the practice-namely, the inherent
and immediate benefit to the individual of carefully and systematically thinking about
and executing an advance directive or, at least, discussing preferences with a health
care proxy. Laws encouraging advance directives provide a structural context in
which individuals can acknowledge their mortality and make the effort to consider and
articulate to themselves and others their values and preferences, resulting in much
potential benefit to themselves, their families and their health care providers, not only
at the end oflife but throughout life. Regularizing this practice throughout adulthood
may gradually reduce the impact of the technology juggernaut on the dying process.
This Article concludes by examining the ways in which end oflife law and the medical
education system might be reformed to promote individual reflection and
conversations between patients and physicians in order to prepare for death.
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I.

Introduction

End of life law, though flawed, offers some
opportunity to express one's values and preferences via advance
directives, health care proxies, and other such mechanisms, in order to
prepare for death before it is imminent. Yet many people avoid the
thinking process that is necessary to make these preparations because
the thought of death is uncomfortable to confront. Most decide,
consciously or unconsciously, not to decide. If the decision not to
decide is the result of a voluntary and considered choice to accept
mortality by relinquishing attempts to exert control over death and
the dying process, then perhaps all is well, at least for the dying
individual, though the medical technology juggernaut may result in
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an undesirable prolongation of the process. If, however, the non
decision arises out of a reluctance and fear to confront death, then the
non-deciders do themselves a disservice, not only at the time of death,
but throughout the life that precedes it.
Modern medical technology has brought to a boil matters which
have simmered in the collective human consciousness for many cen
turies. Beginning in the mid to late nineteenth century, dying was
transformed from an accepted, albeit generally unwelcome, life pas
sage to a medical crisis with the resultant medicalization of the death
1
bed. Around the middle of the nineteenth century, "[t]he most ap
parent manifestation of the medicalization of death took place when
2
the doctor replaced the priest as master of ceremonies." Before then,
it was common for physicians to leave their dying patients in the care
of family members and clergy when they could no longer offer any
useful treatment. By the mid-1800s, expectations and practices
changed and physicians often remained with their dying patients un
til the end. Although this change in practice predated any new ability
to treat dying patients, cultural attitudes toward the death bed were
shifting. Despite their inability to provide any curative care, physi
cians began to believe that they "had a responsibility to hold out
some, even if very limited, course of action to the dying patient, to
3
help her overcome a sense of helplessness."
Well into the twentieth· century, the advent of modern life
supportive technologies and therapies enabled physicians to keep pa
tients alive when their bodies would otherwise succumb to their un

1. Shai Lavi, How Dying Became a "Life Crisis," 137 DAEDALUS 57, 58 (2008);
see also ELIZABETH KUBLER-ROSS, ON DEATH AND DYING 19-20 (1969); Ivan Illich,
Death Undefeated, 311 BRIT. MED. J. 1652, 1652 (1995) (observing "how difficult med

icalisation made the task of family, friends, or chaplain: to arouse the dying per
son's willingness to accept the inevitable, to find strength in the beauty of memo
ries, and to take leave of this world.").
2. Lavi, supra note 1, at 61.
3. Id. As Joan Didion also has observed, modern death differs tremendously
from that of a century ago. At the turn of the twentieth century,
the act of dying had not yet been professionalized. It did not typically
involve hospitals.... At the time [Emily Post] undertook her book of
etiquette, there would have been few American households un
touched by the influenza pandemic of 1918. Death was up close, at
home. The average adult was expected to deal competently, and also
sensitively, with its aftermath.
JOAN DIDION, THE YEAR OF MAGICAL THINKING 60-61 (2005). The same is true,
though more recently, with the medicalization of the process of childbirth.
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derlying disease, injury, or disability. 4 When life-sustaining technolo
gies are used to assist a patient through a difficult illness or injury and
return to health, there is rarely any conflict about their appropriate
ness. When, however, a patient's chronic or acute illness has pro
gressed to the point where there is no hope of cure or even improve
ment, the use of these technologies in a situation that merely prolongs
dying poses complex questions of ethical futility, not to mention wise
5
use of limited medical resources. It is in such situations that conflict
arises as, for example, the protracted legal dispute and public debate
6
over the life and death of Theresa Schiavo so painfully illustrated. In
such cases, the law requires that families, health care providers and,
sometimes, courts attempt to ascertain the wishes of the dying patient
regarding life-prolonging measures in order to carry out the patient's
7
autonomous choices.
But the medicalization of dying has created more than just co
nundrums about the appropriate use of medical technology. The em
phasis on technology as the primary mechanism of medical care has
gradually supplanted, or at least marginalized, other fundamental as
pects of caregiving, such as communication and spending time with
grieving patients and their families. Physicians lament the lost art of
caregiving as the technology of medicine takes over and leaves little
8
time for addressing each patient's emotional needs. Many patients
experiencing fear and confusion about the nature of their disease or
injury and its treatment, or simply sensing that their physicians are

4. See Lavi, supra note 1, at 59 ("The growing use of antibiotics, surgery, and
other technological advances, including life-sustaining machinery, had trans
formed mortality statistics. But extending life had the unintended but inevitable
consequence of prolonging dying and suffering.").
5. As commentators have observed, it is paradoxical that the ever-increasing
technological ability to sustain life has led to significant support for physician
assisted suicide. See Charles J. Sabatino, Reflections on the Meaning of Care, 6
NURSING ETHICS 374, 377 (1999).
6. See Barbara A. Noah, Politicizing the End of Life: Lessons from the Schiavo
Controversy, 59 U. MIAMI L. REv. 107, 107-34 (2005) [hereinafter Politicizing the End
of Life]; Barbara A. Noah, The Role of Religion in the Schiavo Controversy, 6 HOUSTON
J. HEALTHL. &POL'Y 319,319-46 (2006) [hereinafter Role ofReligion].
7. See infra notes 21-48 and accompanying text.
8. See Arthur Kleinman, Forum: On Caregiving, HARV. MAG. July-Aug. 2010
at 29 ("If the ancient Chinese perception is right that we are not born fully human,
but only become so as we cultivate ourselves and our relations with others-and
that we must do so in a threatening world where things often go terribly wrong
and where what we are able to control is very limited-then caregiving is one of
those relationships and practices of self-cultivation that make us, even as we expe
rience our limits and failures, more human.").
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pressed for time-hesitate to ask questions or to express their sense of
9
despair or fear. In this era of highly technological medical care, phy
sicians and patients often feel complementarily reluctant to engage in
thoughtful discussions about the patient's values, preferences, and
concerns or, worse, even to acknowledge openly the fact of the pa
. 10
.
' s d ymg.
t 1ent
Modern medical technology has created a lacuna of end of life
dilemmas, which have triggered a need for legal intervention in end
of life decision making (including an important role for advance direc
tives or, at least, serious conversations with family and health care
11
providers about individual preferences in these matters). In an op
timal situation, there would be no need for law except to acknowledge
12
and defend the presumption of individual choice. In fact, the law of
13
decision making at the end of life is, in a broad sense, well settled.
Nevertheless, because patients often do not or cannot choose, conflicts
about the use of technologies at the end of life do arise and these con
flicts take a substantial toll on families, health care providers, and so
ciety more broadly.
To avoid such conflicts (and their accompanying negative im
pact on end of life care, loved ones, health care providers, and societal
costs), individuals can "practice death"-that is, acknowledge the cer
tainty of death, make and articulate choices about end of life prefer
ences early in adulthood, discuss their preferences with relevant fami
ly members, and revisit these choices on a regular basis via some form

9. Id. at 25 (explaining that "[t]he structure of training and of service delivery
discourages and even disables the art.").
10. See Timothy E. Quill, Initiating End-of-Life Discussions with Seriously Ill Pa
tients: Addressing the "Elephant in the Room," 284 JAMA 2502, 2503 (2000).
11. The same medical technology also created a need for the law to define
"death" for various legal and medical purposes (homicide, estates and trusts law,
organ harvesting, and more). See A Defimtion of Irreversible Coma: Report of the Ad
Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death,
205 JAMA 85 (1968); see also Roger N. Rosenberg, Consciousness, Coma, and Brain
Death-2009, 301 JAMA 1172, 1173 (2009) (explaining that in the last twenty years,
permanent vegetative state and minimal consciousness have been further defined
as separate from coma and brain death); Seema K. Shah & Franklin G. Miller, Can
We Handle the Truth? Legal Fictions in the Determination of Death, 36 AM. J. L. MED.
540, 541 (2010).
12. There are also good arguments for placing some limits on individual au
tonomy, though this discussion is beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., Alex
ander McCall Smith, Beyond Autonomy, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 23
(1997).
13. See infra notes 21-36 and accompanying text.
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of advance care planning document or proxy. For a variety of rea
sons, many individuals in our society appear unwilling to do so, even
though (in the current system) advance planning is crucial to preserve
individual choice should a patient lose decisional capacity. At the
same time, physicians have an obligation to encourage such conversa
tions and to provide a frank and full picture of the patient's situation
so that the conversation reflects the medical reality. The act of consid
ering and discussing end of life choices, whether via a formal docu
ment or conversations with family members and physicians, will do
more to prevent end of life conflicts and over-utilization of life
sustaining technology than any new or revised statute.
To be fair, while those who espouse advance care planning fre
quently argue that such preparations often would avoid much grief
for all those involved, this is not invariably true. Commentary on the
Schiavo case bemoaned the fact that Theresa Schiavo had not complet
ed an advance directive indicating her preferences about health care
15
should she lose decisional capacity. In retrospect, it is doubtful that
an advance directive would have made much difference in Theresa
16
17
Schiavo's case because it became a cause celebre in the culture wars.
But, in many cases, advance care planning can help indicate that the
14. Advance care planning documents (also sometimes referred to collectively
as "individual instructions for health care") include advance directives, values his
tory forms, do-not-resuscitate orders, appointments of health care proxy decision
makers, and POLST (Physician Orders for Life Sustaining Treatment) and related
documents. Depending on the law of the state in which it was executed, an ad
vance directive may apply only when a patient is terminally ill, or it may also ap
ply to patients in persistent vegetative states, irreversible coma, or other "non
terminal" conditions. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW
AND ETHICS 294-95 (6th ed. 2008).
15. See, e.g., Lois Shepherd, Terri Schiavo: Unsettling the Settled, 37 LOY. U.
CHIC. L.J. 297, 315 (2006) (explaining that if Theresa Schiavo had executed a living
will "clearly expressing a desire not to continue feeding in a permanent vegetative
state, that might have sufficed to overcome the deference to [a] proxy's decision to
continue treatment, but mere oral evidence would unlikely have been enough.").
For background on the events of the Schiavo dispute, see Role of Religion, supra
note 6 at 320-29.
16. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. Those who sought to keep
Theresa alive would have argued that she had not anticipated the particular cir
cumstances that she found herself in (permanent unconsciousness but not actively
dying) or that, as a good Catholic, she would defer to the papal declaration de
nouncing the withdrawal of artificial nutrition from patients such as herself. See
Role of Religion, supra note 6 at 339-40 (describing and discussing the papal pro
nouncement that artificial nourishment constitutes "minimal care" for the patient
and that death by starvation from its withdrawal would be "euthanasia by omis
sion").

17. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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patient has given some thought to end of life issues. In its absence,
the default position of continuing care may do as much harm as good,
and therefore deserves careful scrutiny.
The Schiavo case certainly did not end the collective struggle
with decision making for incapacitated patients, particularly those
who are not terminally ill and actively dying. It therefore seems use
ful to consider why such conflicts arise in the first place and why they
are likely to recur in the future. First, at risk of stating the obvious, in
disputes or public debate over decision making for incapacitated pa
tients, we often fail to acknowledge societal discomfort with the sub
jects of death and dying. Second, a major cause of disputes is confu
sion-not only about how to answer the question of what a
decisionally incapacitated person would choose-but more funda
mentally about whether this is the question we should be asking in
18
the first place. The end of life laws in the United States do little to
address this confusion. End of life disputes arise from a cluster of cul
tural issues-including a default position in favor of the utilization of
technology, discomfort with conversations about death and dying,
and the influence of the pro-life culture wars. Ultimately, however,
no amount of legislation can serve to cajole or compel individuals to
confront these issues.
This Article considers the utility of existing law in preventing
and resolving end of life disputes and avoiding over-utilization of life
prolonging technology. 19 It also examines the law's inevitable failure
to address complex issues concerning quality of life, communication
about death, and the unwillingness of many individuals to
acknowledge the reality of mortality, and to plan for that unavoidable
but usually unpredictable event. As other commentators have noted,
advance directives rarely resolve end of life disputes-therefore they
have suggested abandoning efforts to encourage the utilization of ad
vance directives. 20 There is, however, a compelling argument in favor
18. See generally Daniel Brudney, Choosing for Another: Beyond Autonomy and
Best Interests, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 2009, at 31 (discussing differences
among concepts of autonomy, self-determination, and authenticity in making de
cisions for patients who have lost decisional capacity).
19. The next paper in this series considers an alternative to the current ap
proach, which focuses so heavily on patient autonomy as the principle to resolve
end of life disputes. See Barbara A. Noah, Medical Autonomy and Pragmatism (forth
coming 2013) (manuscript on file with author).
20. See, e.g., Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, Enough: The Failure of the Liv
ing Will, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 31 ("In an attempt to extend
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of continuing and expanding the practice-namely, the inherent and
immediate benefit to the individual of thinking about and executing
an advance directive or discussing preferences with a health care
proxy. Laws encouraging advance directives provide a template
through which individuals can make an effort to consider and articu
late to themselves and others their values and preferences. In doing
so, they provide a structural context in which individuals can address
their mortality, resulting in much potential benefit to themselves, their
families and their health care providers, not only at the end of life but
throughout life. This Article ends with an examination of the ways in
which end of life law and the medical education system might be re
formed to promote individual reflection and conversations between
patients and physicians in order to prepare for death.

II. Death and Dying in the Post-Modern (Legal) World
In the United States, we have a vast and multi-layered legal in
strumentarium designed to articulate and protect our health care deci
sion making rights through a combination of federal and state statutes
and judicial decisions. It is well settled that end of life law in the
United States protects an individual's right of decision making about
health care (including the right to ignore the topic), though it does lit
tle to promote the making of those decisions. Virtually every state has
enacted statutes permitting (but not requiring) individuals to assert
21
their wishes via some form of advance directive.
patients' exercise of autonomy beyond their span of competence, resources have
been lavished to make living wills routine and even universal. This policy has not
produced results that recompense its costs, and it should therefore be re
nounced."); John A. Robertson, Second Thoughts on Living Wills, HAsTINGS CENTER
REP., Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 6-7 (acknowledging the benefits, at least superficially, of
living wills, but questioning whether they actually provide valid guidance as to
the later-incompetent patient's wishes and interests).
21. In addition to laws dealing with advance directives, most states have en
acted statutes that formally permit individuals to appoint a health care proxy deci
sion maker via a durable power of attorney for health care decision making. A
formally appointed health care proxy must make decisions either based on the pa
tient's separately-executed advance directive, or if none is available, based on the
patient's values and preferences as the proxy understands them. See Charles P.
Sabatino, The Legal and Functional Status of the Medical Proxy: Suggestions for Statuto
ry Reform, 27 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 52, 58-59 (1999) (providing a summary of state
provisions). Merely appointing a health care proxy, however, even a spouse, does
not ensure that the parties have communicated with any specificity about prefer
ences with regard to end of life care. See Sara M. Moorman et al., Do Older Adults
Know Their Spouses' End-of-Life Treatment Preferences?, 31 REs. ON AGING 463 (2009)
(finding that spouses as surrogate decision makers state their spouses' preferences
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States clearly struggle with the issue of advance directives, their
enforceability, and even their desirability. Some states expressly for
22
bid requiring advance directives, but others have taken a variety of
steps to encourage their citizens to complete an advance directive by
simplifying the process and recognizing the validity of out of state
23
documents. In recent years, some states have attempted to encour
age health care providers to consult existing advance directives by
creating registries that make these documents more easily accessible
24
to providers, especially in emergencies. Still other states have ex
panded the contexts in which advance directives are applicable, in
cluding legislation that recognizes the Physician Order for Life Sus
taining Treatment (POLST) form, which allows patients to request that
physicians withhold life-sustaining treatments and less aggressive in
terventions such as antibiotics, and also includes patient preferences
for resuscitation, artificial nutrition and hydration, and hospital trans
fer.25
incorrectly in end of life scenarios 13% of the time with respect to cognitive im
pairment and 26% of the time with respect to pain management); David Shalowitz
et al., The Accuracy of Surrogate Decision Makers, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 493,
495 (2006) (finding that surrogate decision makers incorrectly predicted patients'
preferences in one-third of cases studied).
22. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-580a-580e West, Westlaw through
the 2012 Feb. Regular Session and June 12 Special Session (2012) (prohibiting the
requirement of an advance directive).
23. For example, North Carolina's statute explicitly recognizes advance direc
tives created in other states as long as they were valid pursuant to the law of the
state where they were created. See N.C.G.S. § 90-321(1) (2012) and N.C.G.S. § 32A
24(d) (2012); see also NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 450b.400-590 (2012) (requiring advance di
rectives that conform to other states' laws to be upheld in Nevada); UTAH CODE §§
75-2a-104, 121 (2012) (simplifying the process by allowing for written or oral ad
vance directives and making a presumption of capacity).
24. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.920-449.925 (2011) (establishing a registry
of advance directives); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.666 (2011) (establishing a registry of
advance directives and Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment (POLST)
forms); cf James Wallace & Norman A. Desbiens, Evaluation of a Labeling System to
Indicate the Presence of an Advance Directive in a Hospital Medical Record, 16 INT'L J.
FOR QUALITY IN HEALTH CARE 333, 334-35 (2004) (finding that only 3% of the stud
ied inpatient population had an advance directive in their medical record and only
46 of 121 medical records studied had a label indicating the presence of an ad
vance directive elsewhere and that many of these labels were inaccurate); see also
Thaddeaus Mason Pope, Legal Briefing: Advance Care Planning, 20 J. CLINICAL
ETHICS 362, 365 (2009) (explaining that a total of eleven state legislatures have en
acted legislation requiring an electronic registry to store health care directives in
order to make these documents readily available to health care providers).
25. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 39-4510 West, Westlaw through end of 2012
2nd Reg. Session of the 61st Legis. (2012) (adding a POLST option); MD Health
Gen. § 5-602 (adding a POLST option); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 90-21.17 (2012) (adding a
POLST option); see also California POLST Form (2011), available at http:/ I
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In addition to these state law efforts, commentators have urged
the development of a simple and effective form that will comply with
6
the legal requirements of all states? Most who favor reform agree
that legislatures should design laws that make the execution of ad
vance directives simple and affordable for their citizens. 27 In addition
to making the format readily available, legislatures should recognize
the legal validity of directives that are executed in proper form with
.
out th e assistance
of an attorney. ~
The Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act provides a template for
state laws relating to advance directives and durable powers of attor
29
ney for health care decisions. It includes a suggested statutory form
for advance directives but also encourages their completion by per
0
mitting individual variations of form/ by not requiring witnesses or
1
notarization/ and by making the advance directive valid regardless
32
of when and where it was executed. In addition, a variety of federal
laws have attempted to encourage individuals to formalize their end
33
of life preferences, all with little success.
www.capolst.org/documents/CAPOLSTform2011 v13web_005.pdf (last visited
Mar. 12, 2013). For more discussion of the utility of POLSTs, see generally Susan
E. Hickman, et al., The POLST (Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment) Para
digm to Improve End-of-Life Care: Potential State Legal Barriers to Implementation, 36 J.
L. MED. & ETHICS 119 (2008); Susan E. Hickman et al., Use of the Physician Orders for
Life-Sustaining Treatment (POLST) Paradigm Program in the Hospice Setting, 12 J.
PALLIATIVE MED. 133, 133-41 (2010).
26. Some suggest that the "Five Wishes" document accomplishes this goal.
See FURROW ET AL., supra note 14, at 298. The "Five Wishes" document is available
at Five Wishes, AGING WITH DIGNITY, www.agingwithdignity.org/five-wishes.php
(last visited Mar. 12, 2013).
27. See, e.g., Dorothy D. Nachman, Living Wills: Is It Time to Pull the Plug?, 18
ELDER L.J. 289,317-18 (2011) (describing a U.S. Senate bill which includes funding
of legal services for advance care planning for low-income people and expands the
portability of validly-executed advance directives from state to state).
28. Although requiring witnesses to the executor's signature makes sense to
reduce the risk of fraud, there seems to be little reason to require the services of a
notary public to validate these documents. See UNIFORM HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS
ACT (1993), available at http:/ /www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/health%20
care%20decisions/uhcda_final_93.pdf ("An advance health-care directive is valid
for purposes of this [Act] if it complies with this [Act], regardless of when or
where executed or communicated.").
29. See id. at § 2(h). As of this writing, some version of this Act has been
adopted in approximately six states. See id. (citing legislative factsheet).
30. See id. at§ 4.
31. Id. at§ 2, § 4 and cmts. (explaining that witness signatures are optional).
32. Id. at§ 2(h).
33. For example, the Patient Self-Determination Act, has had very limited ef
fectiveness in increasing the rate at which adults complete advance directives. See
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-95-135, PATIENT SELF
DETERMINATION ACT: PROVIDERS OFFER INFORMATION ON ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
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Finally, judicial decisions at the state and federal level have add
ed a further common law layer to the state statutes by resolving indi
vidual disputes about end of life care. Many of these disputes involve
uncertainty about the quality or quantity of evidence of a now
incompetent patient's assumed wishes, either because the patient has
4
no advance directive/ or a family member is disputing the appropri
ateness of a health care proxy decision maker, or the relevance of an
35
advance directive.
In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has ad
dressed issues surrounding end of life choices on multiple occasions,
though mainly to opine in one form or another that these are matters
36
best left to the states for regulation.
Ultimately, as the discussion that follows will illustrate, it seems
to be of little practical importance what the law says about advance
directives beyond acknowledging their legal validity when they exist.
These directives and related attempts to announce patient preferences
(such as documents appointing health care proxies) are frequently in
accessible at key decision-making points, irrelevant or insufficiently
specific to address the actual medical decision at hand, overruled by
family members, or ignored by health care providers. Despite all of
these pitfalls, however, the process of making an advance directive
can provide important ancillary benefits-which not only accrue di
rectly for the individual and his or her loved ones, but also more indi
rectly for health care providers and society.
Our legal rights of decision-making are grounded in the ethical
principle of autonomy and include the right to refuse treatment even
37
if one is not terminally ill. These rights also include the right tore-

BUT EFFECTIVENESS UNCERTAIN 2 (1995) (concluding that "advance directives have
been advocated more than they have been used" and that "in general, only 10 to 25
percent of Americans have documented their end of life choices or appointed a
health care agent."); see also Fagerlin & Schneider, supra note 20, at 32 (commenting
on the empirical studies that demonstrate the PSDA's lack of effectiveness).
34. See, e.g., In re Schiavo, 780 So.2d 176; In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
35. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So.2d 176 (2001) (disputing,
among other things, whether it was appropriate for the patient's husband to con
tinue to serve as her surrogate decision-maker). Other disputes concern the best
interests of never-capacitated patients such as infants. See, e.g., In re Baby "K.", 16
F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994).
36. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990);
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
37. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Ct., 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1135 (1986) ("Peti
tioner sought to enforce only a right which was exclusively hers and over which
neither the medical profession nor the judiciary have any veto power. The trial
court could but recognize and protect her exercise of that right.").

The Elder Law Journal

12

VOLUME21

fuse treatment when terminally ill, the right to continue receiving life
prolonging treatment even when terminally ill (though this value be
comes subject to dispute if the treatment appears "futile"), and, in
some states, the right to hasten one's death with the assistance of a
38
p h ys1c1an.
Advance directives, the orthodox argument goes, promote au
tonomy because they formalize an individual's wishes about treat
ment choices and serve as a guide to the treating physician and the
family about how to proceed if the individual is unable to speak for
herself. These documents can give patients who complete them a
sense of control over their health care, should they lose decisional ca
pacity.39 In multiple respects, this sense of control is an illusion. First,
40
these documents may have limited application under state law. Sec
ond, they are not necessarily accurate predictors of what an individual
would really choose under the particular circumstances when deci
41
sionally-incapacitated by illness.
Furthermore, advance directives
42
are seldom made and seldom followed.
In fact, advance directives and the laws which authorize them
may protect patient autonomy (i.e. they can announce a patient's choice
to accept or reject cardiopulmonary resuscitation, for example, or to
decline artificial nutrition or ventilation), but they do little to promote
authenticity in decision making. Individuals frequently do not know
what they want, what choices are theirs, or how to articulate their
0

0

" of 1994, OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800-995
38. See Oregon Death with Dignity Act
(2011); Washington Death with Dignity Act, WASH. REV. CODE§ 70.245 (2012); Bax
ter v. Montana, 224 P.3d 1211 (2009).
39. See Robertson, supra note 20 (acknowledging the benefits, at least superfi
cially, of living wills, but questioning whether they actually provide valid guid
ance as to the later-incompetent patient's wishes and interests).
40. States frequently limit applicability of advance directives to terminal ill
ness, leaving patients who suffer from chronic and debilitating disease with more
limited options, such as the appointment of a health care proxy. See id. at 6.
41. See id. at 8 (noting that those who execute advance directives are "rare
ly ... told that the directive they make reflects their current interests and may not
be a good indicator of their interests as an incompetent patient."); see also Fagerlin
& Schneider, supra note 20, at 33 (arguing that people will have difficulty predict
ing their preferences in advance because they misunderstand illnesses and treat
ments, think about their "choices" only superficially, and change their minds over
time).
42. See Fagerlin & Schneider, supra note 20, at 32, 36 (noting that less than 20%
of Americans have living wills, and studies suggest that living wills rarely influ
ence the level of medical care; at least a quarter of patients with living wills receive
care that is inconsistent with their instructions).
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wishes. These are not the sorts of questions that can be answered in
an attorney's office or hospital admissions desk with a few moments
of reflection. These questions require far more contemplation and in
more detail than one can achieve by simply ticking boxes on a one
size-fits-all form. For confluence of autonomy and authenticity, it is
the responsibility of each individual to think carefully about the vari
44
ous possible scenarios and to make some decisions about what sort
of care the individual wishes to have and what life-prolonging
measures that person might wish to avoid.
Diligently considering these future scenarios and discussing
them in detail with family members may seem unappealing to many
people. An authentic decision requires a reasonably detailed under
standing of the relevant options and their projected impact on the pa
tient's prognosis and quality of life in the context of the patient's val
ues and goals. Even those individuals who do confront these
questions and document their wishes risk being influenced, con
sciously or unconsciously, by family and societal expectations about
what they should choose and when. Even so, advance care planning,
with all of its flaws in content and implementation, helps provide
guidance to family members and health care providers, and serves a
salutary purpose for the individual who willingly takes on the task,
preferably before serious illness or injury arises.
The ethical principle of autonomy coexists in an uneasy detente
with the ethical principle of beneficence, which requires that physi
45
cians provide that care which is in their patients' best interests.
When a patient's wishes are unclear, defining "best interests" is often
difficult. Ideally, when a patient can no longer articulate his wishes,
the decision should center around whether continued treatment
would be the patient's authentic choice-that is, the choice that re
flects careful thought, self-knowledge, and reflection, and that
43. Id. at 33-35 (noting the difficulty of predicting preferences for future un
specified illnesses with unspecified treatments, adding that people do not under
stand treatments well enough to make an informed choice, and usually cannot
write clearly enough to express preferences in detail even if they understood
them).
44. Such scenarios might include, "what if I become mentally incapacitated?,"
"what if I become unable to care for myself?," "what if I develop a medical condi
tion that leaves me in intractable pain or causes me to suffer from continuous
shortness of breath?," and "what if I become permanently unconscious?".
45. See JOHN C. FLETCHER, ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO CLINICAL ETHICS 12 (2d
ed. 1997) (describing beneficence as the "obligation to benefit patients ... and to
further their welfare and interests").
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acknowledges the external influences that shape an individual's iden
tity.46 Autonomy ideally means more than possessing a choice-it
means exercising that choice in a meaningful way which reflects holis
tically the patient's values, preferences, and beliefs within the context
47
of her current, and evolving, life circumstances. Advance directives
drafted with this goal in mind must, therefore, speak with specificity
about the writer's instructions for care when he or she suffers from a
self-defined "intolerable indignity" as a result of a medical condi
tion.48 It requires the confrontation of death, its inevitability, and
even, eventually, its possible desirability.
The co-existence of principles of autonomy and beneficence cre
ates disagreements about the futility of life-supportive medical tech
nology, and these disputes are embedded into many end of life con
flicts. Physicians, patients, or families may question whether and
when further treatment or life-sustaining measures are no longer
49
New technologies also create
medically or ethically appropriate.
50
new ethical dilemmas. The futility conundrum is obvious-futility
46. For a thorough discussion of different perspectives on the meaning of au
tonomy, see M. Gregg Bloche, Beyond Autonomy: Coercion and Morality in Clinical
Relationships, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 229, 276-91 (1996).
47. See Brudney, supra note 18, at 33 (discussing the concept of autonomy as
.self-determination and suggesting that focusing on the distinction between desire
and choice is helpful in understanding autonomy-we desire certain things that
we may choose not to act on).
48. See Norman L. Cantor, Making Advance Directives Meaningful, 4 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 629, 639--41 (1998) (discussing how a declarant can "effectively
communicate the degree of deterioration at which death would, for that person, be
preferable to continued existence.").
49. Futility questions arise in two categories-questions of the subjective val
ue of the medical intervention and questions about the probability that the medical
intervention will be successful. See Robert D. Truog et al., The Problem with Futility,
326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1560, 1561 (1992).
50. In one recent case, a patient who had a left ventricular assist dev~ce
(LVAD) implanted to supplement his heart's ability to circulate blood later re
quested that the pump be shut off because he found life intolerable with his pro
found disability. A bioethicist, commenting on the case, wrote that disabling the
LVAD would be "tantamount to removing the patient's heart." See Rob Stein,
Heart Pump Creates Life-Death Ethical Dilemmas, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2008, at Al.
Such drastic statements perpetuate the misimpression that one has an ethical obli
gation to stick with life-sustaining technologies once they are started. New brain
imaging technologies such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (FMRl) pose
different but equally vexing dilemmas. FMRl technology allows physicians to
identify localized neural activity in the brain that was previously undetectable
through observable patient responses. These scans have called into question the
accuracy of diagnoses of permanent vegetative state, raising questions about the
consequent appropriateness of withdrawal of life-sustaining measures from these
patients. See J. Andrew Billings et al., Severe Brain Injury and the Subjective Life,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 2010, at 17, 18-20.
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is in the eye of the beholder, so that families, patients, and health care
providers may fail to agree on an appropriate point to discontinue
technological interventions. Without guidance about an individual
patient's beliefs regarding continued life-supportive measures, it is
difficult to know when to cease providing support to a person whose
condition will not improve. In such circumstances, the U.S. health
care system and its providers are reluctant to opine about an incapaci
tated patient's best interests, and generally will revert to erring on the
side of continued treatmene1
With the evolution of life-supportive technologies and interven
tions, we add to our arsenal for delaying death-we almost always
can do something more. We have all heard grieving families assure
others that "the doctors did everything they could." "Doing every
thing" may help assuage feelings of helplessness on the part of fami
lies and care givers, but it is not necessarily in the patient's best inter
52
ests, nor does it necessarily reflect the patient's authentic choice.
One important aspect of the futility question concerns quality of life.
Even if a treatment or technology extends life, should physicians pro
vide it if the patient will experience no added benefit in the form of
improved function? As a society, we experience serious discomfort
when consid~ring quality of life as a factor in resolving disputes about
the continuation of arguably futile care. Rather than address uncom
fortable quality of life questions, however, we "err on the side of life"
even when all sentience is permanently gone.
As Schiavo and other cases of its type illustrate, many individuals
take the position that our end-of-life laws should default on the side of
continued treatment whenever a patient's choice or best interest is in
3
dispute and decline to assess the quality of that life in doing so. 5 Giv
51. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 283 (1990) (dis
cussing the risks of an erroneous decision to withdraw life-support from a patient
who lacks decisional capacity).
52. Cf. Sean Palfrey, Daring to Practice Low-Cost Medicine in a High-Tech Era,
NEW ENG. J. MED., at e21(1), e21(1) (2011), available at http:/ /www.nejm.org/
doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMpl101392?ssource=hcrc (commenting on the mistaken be
lief that "'doing everything' is the best practice and the way to prevent harm").
53. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990) ("[A]
state may properly decline to make judgments about the 'quality' of life that a par
ticular person may enjoy and simply assert an unqualified interest in the preserva
tion of human life to be weighed against the constitutionally protected interests of
the individual."); Wendland v. Wendland, 28 P.3d 151, 174 (Cal. 2001) (upholding
a trial court decision to continue life-sustaining treatment despite a proxy decision
maker's request to withdraw it because the proxy "offered no basis for such a find
ing other than her own subjective judgment that the conservatee did not enjoy a
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en that several opinion polls establish that the majority of people say
they would prefer not to continue living in a permanent vegetative
4
state} and given the astonishing amount of health care resources we
5
use in the final months of our lives} why does the law presume that,
when a patient's wishes are unknown, that patient would wish to con
tinue treatment or life-supportive measures? Part of the answer is, of
course, that keeping a patient alive "in error" is capable of correction
in the future, should additional information about the patient's wishes
or condition become available. Implicit in this "err on the side of life"
mentality is an unwillingness to make quality of life assessments. A
biologic view of life is a binary view-that a person is either "alive" or
"dead." It fails to account for the range of intermediate levels of un
consciousness or other sorts of disability or suffering in which a per
son with decisional capacity might choose to forego additional life
prolonging treatment. A purely biologic view of life certainly pre
6
sents an easy to apply bright-line rule for courts. 5 But for persons to
whom this approach is applied, the presumption in favor of continued
treatment risks demeaning the individual or disregarding his prefer
ences.
Much of the commentary on the Schiavo case also noted the in
appropriate influences of politics, religion, and the so-called "culture
7
wars" on the resolution of this dispute. 5 During the final years before

satisfactory quality of life and legally insufficient evidence to the effect that he
would have wished to die"); In re Conservatorship of Helga M. Wanglie, No. PX
91-283, Dist. Ct. Prob. Ct. Div. (Minn. 1989) (upholding the surrogate's request for
continued treatment of the patient, who was in a persistent vegetative state and
who died more than a year later of sepsis).
54. See, e.g., Kelly Gullo, ed., Harris Interactive Health Care Poll, By a Near
Four-to-One Margin, U.S. Adults Favor Not Taking Additional Steps to Prolong the Lives
of Patients in a Persistent Vegetative State, Apr. 12, 2005 (copy on file with author);
Lydia Saad, Americans Choose Death Over Vegetative State, GALLUP (Mar. 29, 2005),
http: I I www.gallup.com/poll/15448 I americans-choose-death-over-vegetative
state.aspx.
55. Cf Andrew Stern, Discussing End-of-Life Care Lowers Cost-U.S. Study,
REUTERS (Mar. 9, 2009), available at http:/ /www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/
idUSN06415881.
56. Cf In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994) (resolving, on technical statuto
ry grounds, a dispute about continued life supportive measures for an anence
phalic infant and thus defaulting to protection of purely biologic life).
57. See, e.g., George J. Annas, "I Want to Live": Medicine Betrayed by Ideology in
the Political Debate Over Terri Schiavo, 35 STETSON L. REV. 49 (2005); Kathy L.
Cerminara, Collateral Damage: The Aftermath of the Political Culture Wars in Schiavo,
29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 279 (2007); Politicizing the End of Life, supra note 6, at 107;
John A. Robertson, Schiavo and Its (In)Significance, 35 STETSON L. REV. 101 (2005);
Shepherd, supra note 15, at 297.
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Theresa Schiavo died, there was an astonishing outpouring of pas
sionate public sentiment (both supportive and condemnatory) at the
court's decision to order the removal of her feeding tube. 58 The dis
pute over Theresa Schiavo's care provided a worst-case scenario for
resolving an ethical conflict at the end of life. For politicians to im
pose a presumption of continued life at all costs when it is inconsistent
with the individual patient's preferences represents the worst kind of
potential harm because the presumption, in many cases, will funda
mentally violate principles of autonomy and beneficence. The Schiavo
battle, which pitted political and religious conservatives against The
resa's husband and the courts which had agreed with him that she
would have chosen to forego continued life support, presented an un
comfortable cultural irony: the pro-life religious organizations which
battled to keep Theresa alive at all costs were keeping her, a commu
nicant of the Catholic church, from achieving the peace that her faith
promises.
Choosing to "err on the side of life" as a default in order to avoid
difficult conversations about quality of life has created a further ethi
cal dilemma when coupled with broadly available medical technolo
gies designed to sustain (biological) life. As a society, we are equally
reluctant to consider explicitly or to discuss the cost of end of life care
as we evaluate whether and when to cease life-supportive measures
and therapeutic interventions. Although it is well documented that
"one-third of expenses in the last year of life are spent in the final
month ... with aggressive treatments in the final month accounting
59
for 80 percent of those costs," we often persist in "doing everything"
and we celebrate those patients who "fight until the end." Similarly,
we, as patients, frequently misunderstand or simply fail to receive sta
tistical information about the potential success of various treatments
and interventions. 60 Statistical fallacies and unreasonable optimism
lead patients to request and physicians to provide treatments that of
fer little or no real promise of benefit and to discount the potential and
61
often probable harms of such care.
Physicians also tend to over
58. See Role of Religion, supra note 6, at 327-29 (describing last ditch efforts by
interest groups and politicians to intervene in the Schiavo case).
59. Stern, supra note 55.
60. See Lynn A. Jansen et al., Unrealistic Optimism in Early-Phase Oncology Tri
als, 33 IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES. 1, 2-7 (2011).
61. See id. (concluding that, despite disclosures in informed consent about the
early-stage cancer trials that they were enrolled in, patients tended to underesti
mate the risks to themselves and overestimate the prospective benefit).
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estimate the remaining life spans of seriously ill patients and to con
62
vey prognosis in overly optimistic terms.
In fact, those patients who opt against therapeutic care in the
face of severe chronic or terminal illness capture our attention and
remind us that, sometimes, "doing everything" is not the best option
for the patient, particularly when the adverse effects associated with
treatment interfere with the patient's ability to enjoy life and provide
63
little added time.
Recent research confirms this conclusion. In a
study of over 600 patients with advanced cancer, those patients who
had end of life planning discussions with their physicians expended
significantly less in health care costs in the final week of life and expe
rienced less psychological and physical distress than those who did
64
not discuss options with their physicians. Survival times between
the two studied groups were equal on average, but higher health care
spending at the end of life was associated with poorer quality of life in
65
the last weeks before death.
The study suggests "that increasing
communication between patients and their physicians is associated

62. See Nicholas A. Christakis & Elizabeth B. Lamont, Extent and Determinants
of Error in Doctors' Prognoses in Terminally Ill Patients, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 469, 470-71
(2000) (finding that, in predicting patients' remaining life expectancies, physicians
were correct only 20% of the time and were over-optimistic 63% of the time and
concluding that a closer doctor-patient relationship was associated with over
optimistic predictions); see also Lisa I. Iezzoni et al., Survey Shows That at Least Some
Physicians Are Not Always Open or Honest with Patients, 31 HEALTH AFFAIRS 383,
383-88 (2012) (discussing a survey finding that one-in-ten physicians admitted to
lying to a patient within the previous year and over half of those surveyed
acknowledged that they had been unrealistically optimistic about a patient's prog
nosis).
63. See, e.g., PETER NOLL, IN THE FACE OF DEATH (Hans Noll Trans., 1989)
(memoir detailing the author's decision to forego treatment for his bladder cancer
in order to enjoy the remainder of his life without the burden of surgery's and ra
diation's adverse effects); Amy Berman, Can Good Care Produce Bad Health?,
HEALTH AGENDA (Jan. 11, 2011, 3:19 PM), http:/ /www.jhartfound.org/blog/
?p=2765 (discussing the author's decision not to seek treatment for her incurable
stage IV breast cancer and the health care system's bias in favor of quantity rather
than quality of life); Greg A. Sachs, Sometimes Dying Still Stings, 284 JAMA 2423,
2423 (2000) (describing the death of a family member who opted for no cancer
therapy and remained relatively well until the last two days of his life).
64. Baohui Zhang et al., Health Care Costs in the Last Week of Life: Associations
With End-of-Life Conversations, 169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 480, 482-84 (2009)
(finding that the average expenditure in the final week for patients who discussed
end of life options with their physicians was $1,876 compared with $2,917 for those
who did not).
65. Id. (finding that patients did not experience any shortening of life as are
sult of their decisions not to use intensive interventions such as ventilator sup
port).
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with better outcomes and with less expensive medical care." In fact,
a growing body of evidence demonstrates that an emphasis on pallia
tive care rather than aggressive therapy can improve patients' quality
67
of life and even prolong survival. Continuing aggressive care also
poses risks of iatrogenic harm and additional pain or discomfort, often
with no discernable off-setting physical benefit. Prolonging therapy
when it offers only speculative benefit to the patient also needlessly
increases costs in a health care system that is already straining to meet
68
its obligations.

III. Denial of Mortality
The willingness to engage in the kind of self-examination that is
consistent with making advance directives depends in part on cultural
factors, and in part on individual characteristics. For multiple reasons,
we collectively have little appetite to address end of life issues before
they arise in crisis form. The luxury of time, in the form of longer life
spans, together with the promise of new therapies, has created the il
lusion that there is time to procrastinate, to delay confronting mortali
ty, perhaps even the hope of postponing death indefinitely.
Until relatively recently, religious faith played a dominant role
in the lives of many, if not most people. Most faiths, including Chris
tianity, offer the promise of life after bodily death, at least if the indi
vidual has taken the appropriate steps to achieve salvation. For those
who have faith, the promise of salvation must surely provide some

66. Id. at 487. Without regard to having end of life discussions with their
physicians, the raw numbers of patients whose treatment preferences favored ag
gressive interventions despite having advanced cancer were substantial: 158 out of
603 patients stated that they valued life possible extension over comfort, 142 of the
603 preferred ventilator use to extend life, and 122 of 603 stated that they preferred
everything possible to extend life for a few days. Id. at 483 tbl.l.
67. "Palliative care" refers to medical care intended to alleviate symptoms
associated with illness, whatever the patient's prognosis. Such care may address
pain, shortness of breath, insomnia, depression, nausea and lack of appetite,
among other symptoms. See Lise M. Stevens, Palliative Care, 296 JAMA 1428, 1428
(2006).
68. It is well documented that one-third of medical expenses for the last year
of life are spent in the final month and that aggressive therapies and technologies
in that final month account for nearly 80% of these costs. See Zhang, supra note 64,
at 480. Moreover, 30% of Medicare dollars spent go to care for the 5% of Medicare
beneficiaries who die each year. See Amber E. Barnato et al., Trends in Inpatient
Treatment Intensity Among Medicare Beneficiaries at the End of Life, 39 HEALTH
SERVICES RES. 363, 363-64 (2004).
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69

comfort in the face of death. Yet, Christianity also acknowledges the
70
fear of death. When society had all the rituals of organized religion,
there was a pre-approved homogenous pathway, a set of instructions
about how to live right and, finally, enter Paradise. Surprisingly,
some recent research suggests that religious beliefs and traditions do
71
not decrease fear of death, and a recent study in fact indicates that
terminally ill patients who profess some sort of religious faith or prac
tice are more likely than agnostic or atheist patients to seek aggressive
72
care at the end of life.
Today, in a more secular age, many individuals lack the frame
work of religious belief to navigate the prospect death and dying. As
one commentator noted, "[f]or the last two millennia at least, tight
rope-walking theists have been keenly aware that, should the safety
net of resurrection fail, there is nothing between them and the solid
73
ground of mortalism." For many people, the pathway of organized
religion no longer exists. With that safety net of formal religion gone,
the fear of death may be grounded in the realization that it is up to the
69. As Henry Scott Holland, Canon of St. Paul's Cathedral, wrote, "Death is
nothing at all I I have only slipped away into the next room I I am I and you are
you I Whatever we were to each other I That we are still I ... Life means all that
it ever meant. I It is the same that it ever was I ... I am waiting for you I for an
interval I Somewhere very near I Just around the corner I All is well." Henry
Scott Holland, Death is Nothing at All, (published in Facts of the Faith, 1919), available
at http:/ /www.poeticexpressions.co.uk/POEMS/Death%20is%20nothing%20at
%20all%20-%20Canon%20Henry%20Scott-Holland.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2013).
70. Many medieval poems included the phrase "Timor mortis conturbat me"
("The fear of death distresses me"). The phrase comes from a responsory of the
Catholic Office of the Dead in the third Nocturn of Matins. See Richard L. Greene,
A Middle English "Timor Mortis" Poem, 28 MODERN LANGUAGE REV. 234, 234-38
(1933). The Book of Psalms contains a plea for more time before the singer con
fronts his death: "Hear my prayer, 0 Lord, and give ear unto my cry; hold not thy
peace at my tears: for I am a stranger with thee, and a sojourner, as all my fathers
were. 0 spare me, that I may recover strength, before I go hence, and be no more."
Psalm 39:12-13 (King James).
71. See Timothy P. Daaleman & Larry VandeCreek, Placing Religion and Spirit
uality in End-of-Life Care, 284 JAMA 2514, 2514 (2000) (noting that the research into
this question has generated "controversial results").
72. See Andrea C. Phelps et al., Religious Coping and Use of Intensive Life
Prolonging Care Near Death in Patients with Advanced Cancer, 301 JAMA 1140, 1144
(2009) (concluding that high levels of religious coping were strongly associated
with a preference for intensive life-prolonging care at the end of life, including
ventilation and resuscitation). The authors of the study were unable to explain the
association between religiousness and the preference for aggressive care at the end
of life. Id. at 1141. The authors speculate that perhaps these preferences arise from
a sense that the sanctity of life requires all available efforts to prolong it and that
suffering at death furthers a religious purpose. Id. at 1145.
73. PETER D. HEINEGG, MORTALISM: READINGS ON THE MEANING OF LIFE 10
(2003).
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individual to determine how to live life well and thus reconcile herself
to mortality.
Unlike the rest of the animals, we are conscious of our mortality.
Our superiority in this regard brings with it fear of death. Philoso
pher Ernst Becker has captured the paradox quite elegantly: "Man is
literally split in two: he has an awareness of his own splendid unique
ness in that he sticks out of nature with a towering majesty, and yet he
goes back into the ground a few feet in order blindly and dumbly to
74
rot and disappear forever." As Becker observes, this "existential du
75
alism makes an impossible situation, an excruciating dilemma."
Thus, man resorts to a form of "blind obliviousness with social games,
psychological tricks, personal preoccupations so far removed from the
76
reality of his situation that they are forms of madness."
Much of
how some individuals occupy their days serves either to deny that
death is real or to somehow make its reality, when unavoidably
77
glimpsed, more palatable.
These individual, intimately personal struggles are reinforced at
a societal level in a variety of ways. For one, the conflict between the
conservative, pro-life religious movement and our rule of law's fun
damental respect for individual autonomy has devolved into an ex
tremely polarizing conflict between faith and science. In recent years,
the United States has seen political and religious conservatives inten
tionally reject and undermine meaningful discussion about end of life
care in favor of appealing to their base with superficial or false and
78
misleading characterizations of issues.
Sarah Palin's fear-monger
rhetoric about government-sponsored "death panels" provides a

74. ERNST BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH 26 (1973).
75. Id. at 27.
76. Id.

77. Philosopher S0ren Kierkegaard' s concept of busyness seems to explain
quite a lot of what we do to avoid thinking about difficult truths. See S0REN
K!ERKEGAARD, PURITY OF HEART Is TO WILL ONE THING 108 (1847) ("But the reason
may need to be explained ... why, in the press of busyness, there is neither time
nor quiet to win the transparency that is indispensable if a man is to come to un
derstand himself .... Nay, the press of busyness into which one steadily enters
further and further, and the noise in which the truth continually slips more and
more into oblivion, and the mass of connections, stimuli, and hindrances, these
make it ever more impossible for one to win any deeper knowledge of himself.").
78. Cf Rudy Ruiz, Commentary, Open Your Minds, America, CNN.COM (Sept.
3, 2009), http: I I articles.cnn.com/2009-09-03 /politics/ ruiz.closed.minds_l_health
care-listening-labels?_s=PM:POLITICS (suggesting that, with the health care de
bate, we should be listening to differing opinions and acknowledge that changing
one's mind in the face of new information is not a character flaw).
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memorable example? These sorts of careless and ill-advised pro
nouncements frustrate any reasonable attempts to engage in careful
discussion and necessary debate about ethically complex end of life
.
80
Issues.
In a different realm, cultural portrayals of older people in this
society further exacerbate feelings of ambivalence about aging. As the
average life span lengthens, we hear phrases like "fifty is the new thir
ty" and advertisements for "adult communities" (no longer "retire
ment communities" or "elder housing") depict smiling, vigorous,
81
nimble people playing golf and tennis. As a society, we also deny
the reality of aging and death by celebrating youth and physical per
82
fection and by seeking it for ourselves. We cut, plump, inject with

79. See Sarah Palin, Statement on the Current Health Care Debate, FACEBOOK
(Aug. 7, 2009,3:25 PM), http:/ /www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=l13851
103434 ("The America I know and love is not one in which my parents or my baby
with Down Syndrome will have to stand in front of Obama's 'death panel' so his
bureaucrats can decide, based on a subjective judgment of their 'level of produc
tivity in society,' whether they are worthy of health care."). Palin's statement ac
tually referred to a proposal in President Obama's health care reform legislation to
provide Medicare beneficiaries with optional and free counseling on end of life de
cision making, including the option of making an advance directive to announce
the individual's preferences about life supportive care. See Michelle Andrews, Ra
ther Than Creating 'Death Panels,' New Law Adds to End-of-Life Options, WASH. POST,
Sept. 7, 2010, at HE5 (explaining that, in the wake of the outcry, legislators aban
doned the provision). The damage created by these lies (a very effective, though
mad, form of busyness) was significant. In a Kaiser Family Foundation poll of
Medicare-eligible senior citizens, more than one-third believed that the health re
form bill would allow government panels to make decisions about end of life care
for Medicare recipients. See Kaiser Health Tracking Poll, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (J u
ly 2010), www .kff.org/kaiserpolls/8084.cfm?RenderForPrint=1.
80. Conflict about the sanctity of life may have more to do with political pow
er and profiteering or with psychological displacement than any genuine concern
about the merits of the arguments. It is, at least in part, another distraction from
mortality, another manifestation of Kierkegaard's busyness.
81. Cf Mark D. Bauer, "Peter Pan" as Public Policy: Should Fifty-Five-Plus Age
Restricted Communities Continue to be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws and Substantive
Federal Regulation?, 21 ELDER L.J. 33, 36,42-43 (2013) (describing the amenities and
shortcomings of 55+ communities).
82. We are bombarded constantly with images and promises of youth and
rejuvenation. Airline magazine advertisements, for example, tout pills and hor
mone treatments for all sorts of ills associated with aging: a "brain oxygen
boosting miracle energizes mind, mood and memory ... sharpens focus, clears
away brain fog, erases 15 years of lost memory power!"; an exhortation to "choose
life, grow young with HGH" (human growth hormone); and another program that
promises that its "balanced combination of nutrition, exercise and hormone opti
mization" will "reverse[] the signs and symptoms of aging" including "decreased
risk of age-related disease ... increased energy, increased sex drive, sharper think
ing." (Copies on file with author); see also Thomas H. Perls et al., Provision or Dis
tribution of Growth Hormone for "Antiaging," 294 JAMA 2086, 2086 (2005) (describ
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muscle-paralyzing toxins and much more in the pursuit of physical
83
perfection and perpetual youth.
As one commentator wryly ob
served, "[o]nce regarded as an unyielding, utterly unforgiving, brute
feature of existence, death is increasingly portrayed as a bad lifestyle
84
option."
In the tradition of the best hucksters selling wonder potions and
elixirs on the American frontier, some researchers now talk of dou
85
bling the human life span, even of a "cure for death," and of aging as
86
a "disease" that should be "treated." Research is underway to elim
inate error rate in cell division at the molecular level in order to post
87
pone death or evade it altogether. Although commentators have el
oquently questioned the research imperative and its unintended
88
consequences, so-called "cures for death," and strategies to reduce

ing the proliferation of websites marketing HGH and commenting on the multi
million dollar and growing "antiaging" industry).
83. See LAURIE ESSIG, AMERICAN PLASTIC: BOOB JOBS, CREDIT CARDS, AND OUR
QUEST FOR PERFECTION, at xiii, 84 (2010) (noting that the rate of plastic surgery has
increased by 465% in the past decade and discussing the American woman's battle
against "ordinary ugliness" with plastic surgery and the underlying causes for
failure to accept the effects of aging's normal wear and tear on the body such as
"stretch marks, cellulite, wrinkles, the downward pull of gravity ....").
84. Leigh Turner, Antiaging, 292 JAMA 2155, 2155 (2004).
85. Closing in on the Cure for Death, FIGHT AGING! (Sept. 2, 2003), http:/ I
www.fightaging.org/ archives/2003 I 09 I closing-in-on-the-cure-for-death.
php; see also Penni Crabtree, Fountain of Youth with Just a Shot in the Arm?, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, July 25, 2005, at Al (describing the Institute's claims and
explaining that mainstream science has debunked anti-aging claims as "huckster
ism" that offers little or no benefit but poses potentially serious health risks).
86. See Daniel Callahan, Death and the Research Imperative, 342 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 654, 654-55 (2000) (quoting William Haseltine, then CEO of Human Genome
Sciences as saying that "[d]eath is a series of preventable diseases" and arguing
that research "should not, even implicitly, have eradication of death as its goal"
because it supplants emphasis on the importance of relieving suffering at the end
of life and it "promotes the idea among the public and physicians that death repre
sents a failure of medicine.").
87. See, e.g., Mariela Jaskelioff et al., Telomerase Reactivation Reverses Tissue De
generation in Aged Telomerase-Deficient Mice, 469 NATURE 102, 104 (2010) (conclud
ing, astonishingly, that correcting degeneration of the telomeres at the ends of
mouse chromosomes, which are responsible for mutations during cell division, not
only halted aging in mice but also reversed previous age-related degeneration of
the brain). Similar research is supported by the Methusaleh Foundation, which
sponsors a competition for researchers to develop technologies that break the
world record for mouse longevity and mouse rejuvenation. See METHUSALEH
FOUNDATION, www.mprize.org (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
88. As Daniel Callahan succinctly explains,
Medical technology seems to know no boundaries because it is hard
to say just what bodily failings and lethal threats we should be willing
to accept. The medical research agenda n:ow goes after all lethal dis
eases, but it also goes after human enhancements and wish fulfill
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morbidity in old age continue with little regard for the cultural conse
quences of the utterly distorted and absurd message it sends. This
quest for a fountain of youth denies the reality of mortality, not to
mention the fact that more days or years of life do not necessarily
guarantee more quality of life or more happiness.
Paradoxically, alongside this anti-aging research juggernaut, we
have at the same time made an "industry" of death and dying. In the
United States and elsewhere, there are multitudes of death memoirs
and manuals, sharing websites and blogs, on the experience and pro
cess of terminal illness. Death memoirs are nothing new, but they ap
89
pear to have multiplied in recent decades. Some of these memoirs
contemplate what it means to be a patient captive to medicine and
disease, or describe a brave battle and its consequent appreciation of
90
life. Others explain the experience of terminal illness as casting the
sufferer into the role of an outsider, no longer a member of society in
91
the usual sense.
The modern tendency to share one's innermost
thoughts and experiences of illness via blogs and specialized social
networks seems paradoxical when juxtaposed with the unwillingness

ment. Death itself is made to seem an accidental, contingent event.
Why do we now die? Not because of the inherent finitude of the hu
man body, as most people thought for most of human history. We
die, it is said, because we engage in unhealthy lifestyles, or because
research has not yet found a cure for our diseases.
Daniel Callahan, Too Much of a Good Thing: How Splendid Technologies Can Go
Wrong, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 21.
89. The German language even has a compound noun for such books
"Krebsbiichlein" or, roughly translated, "little cancer book."
90. See, e.g., EDWARD E. ROSENBAUM, A TASTE OF MY OWN MEDICINE (1988);
JOHN GUNTHER, DEATH BE NOT PROUD (1949) (telling the story of the author's
son's struggle with a brain tumor and his death at age seventeen).
91. See PETER NOLL, IN THE FACE OF DEATH 3-5 (Hans Noll, trans., 1984). Pe
ter Noll's book provides an intriguing and ultimately disturbing explanation of
how he sees his outsider role as a logical continuation of what he has done all his
life. In it, he explains his refusal of aggressive treatment for his cancer, not for re
ligious reasons (although his father was a cleric) but for reasons of individual hu
manity and autonomy, a carefully considered decision to choose what is right and
correct for himself, rather than to take any kind of public stance on end of life care.
The author, upon deciding to refuse smgery to resect his bladder cancer, com
ments that
[n]aturally it is appropriate to show a patient who chooses metastasis
instead of the technological prolongation of death a certain admira
tion, even though, strictly speaking, he hardly deserves it, for he real
ly has only a choice between two evils, and it is almost pmely a ques
tion of taste as to which he prefers.
Id. at3-4.
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to engage in advance care planning or to acknowledge and accept ag
ing and the prospect of death.

IV. The Role of Law in Confronting Death
So what, if anything, does all of this have to do with law? The
short answer: despite the multiplicity of state and federal statutes and
judicial decisions that address end of life decision making, not much.
The problem we confront runs much deeper than what any law can
solve. Our culture discourages self-examination as a part of the pro
cess of preparing for dying and death. We unconsciously (or some
times deliberately) decide not to make choices that are ours to make.
Yet, our legal rights regarding end of life decision making only have
their fullest impact and meaning if we confront end of life issues long
before a crisis of trauma or illness forces the issue.
Although advance directives are only occasionally consulted in
making treatment decisions for patients who have lost decisional ca
pacity, the process of thinking about the issues to which a good ad
vance directive demands attention is inherently valuable, not only as
an opportunity to exercise some choice over the manner of one's death
but also as a means of enhancing life. The process itself-thinking
about an advance directive, revising it, and discussing it with physi
cian and family-presents an opportunity for each individual to reori
ent himself individually to goals and ways of living that have mean
ing on a very personal level. Ultimately, advance directives are about
living, not dying.
In addition to the reforms discussed above that focus on regular
izing the process of making advance directives and promoting inter
state recognition, states should publicize the purposes and availability
of these documents and should promote them as part of the daily
business of being a citizen of the state. Although the idea of mandat
ing advance directives raises serious concerns about privacy and au
tonomy, there seems no reason to discourage states from promoting
the execution of these documents. Just as we ask people to indicate
their willingness to be organ donors on their driving licenses, general
practitioners could similarly make an annual inquiry about memorial
izing end of life preferences, though physicians already struggle to
care for patients during the limited time allocated for an annual exam.
Unfortunately, the design of our health care system does not foster
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long-term relationships between physicians and patients. Those in
dividuals who are fortunate enough to have health insurance still are
likely to change general practitioners fairly frequently, particularly
when they change employmene3 When serious illness occurs, spe
cialists become involved in care, often omitting to include general
practitioners in the conversation or to maintain a seamless exchange
of information among themselves.
States also should educate their citizens about the value of peri
odic review and encourage individuals to revisit their choices as their
94
States might even
values, experiences, and circumstances change.
consider including information about end of life issues and end of life
rights in their public school health curricula. Teaching young adults
about these issues (along with safe sexual practices and good nutri
tion) would likely help to improve their comfort level with thinking
about and discussing such matters throughout their lives. Over time,
education about advance care planning and regularizing inquiries and
updates could make advance directives as natural a part of citizenship
as obtaining vehicle registration stickers or paying property taxes
(and, at least superficially, far less burdensome than either of these).
Still, it seems likely that many people, perhaps the vast majority,
would choose to postpone addressing end of life issues, perhaps for
some of the same reasons that people refuse to consider organ dona
95
tion in the face of concerted government action to encourage it. All
92. Cf Quill, supra note 10, at 2504 (quoting a clinician who felt that she had
"lost [her patient] in the system" after he was transferred to a long-term care facili
ty where he would likely die, rather than dying at home with hospice, where she
could be part of the ending).
93. Most insured individuals in the United States outside of the Medicare
population receive their health insurance as an employee benefit. See BARRY R.
FURROW ET AL., THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 347 n.1
(6th ed. 2008); cf Ann S. O'Malley et al., Coordination of Care by Primary Care Prac
tices: Strategies, Lessons and Implications, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYSTEM
CHANGE, Apr. 2009, at 1, 3, available at http:/ /www.hschange.com/CONTENT/
1058/.
94. At least a few states have chosen to put some resources into education.
For example, in 2007 New York created a program to educate the public about the
need for advance directives and health care proxies. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW§
207 (Consol. 2012); see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 442.5 (2012) (requiring
that if a health care provider diagnoses a patient with a terminal condition, the
provider must provide the patient with information regarding end of life options);
VT. STAT. ANN. 18 § 1871 (2012, Westlaw through the laws of the Adjourned Ses
sion on the 2011-2012 Vermont General Assembly) (same).
95. Concerns about making organ documents of gift and concerns about mak
ing advance directives sometimes arise from the misperception that physicians
will make less effort to preserve the lives of potential organ donors or those who
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of these suggested reforms to the law only go part of the way to ad
dressing the inevitable struggle with end of life issues. The broader,
unanswered question is what else, outside of the legal system, can en
courage individuals to address these questions on a personal level be
fore the critical moment arrives? Autonomy does not have much
meaning without the courage and foresight to think about what is im
portant to us as individuals-whether it is achieving the longest life
possible, minimizing life with disability, or perhaps tolerating disabil
ity so long as cognitive abilities remain unimpaired-and to memori
alize these preferences through serious conversations with family
members or via a written document. Of course, there is also the op
tion to ignore reality and to pretend that we are immortal. This denial
injures not only ourselves but also those around us by raising the risk
of conflicts within families or between families and health care pro
viders and by potentially imposing the burden of deciding on a family
member.
From the perspective of health care providers, these conversa
tions are also difficult. Physicians have long struggled with feelings
96
of powerlessness, grief, or failure when patients die. Educating phy
sicians and medical students about effective patient communication
can foster participatory decision making and meaningful conversa
tion. The medical literature suggests that the goal of quality commu
nication has received more attention recently, though time constraints
97
and individual predispositions probably limit it overall. Discussions
about the imminence of death and the patient's preferences regarding
indicate preferences to refuse life-sustaining treatment. See generally Symposium,
Precious Commodities: The Supply & Demand of Body Parts, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 793
(2006).
96. See R. S. Kane, The Defeat of Aging Versus the Importance of Death, 44 J. AM.
GERIATRIC Soc. 321, 321-22 (1996); Diane E. Meier et al., The Inner Life of Physicians
and Care of the Seriously Ill, 286 JAMA 3007, 3007-08 (2001) (encouraging physicians

to be self-aware, to acknowledge their emotions as they care for dying patients in
order to improve quality of care, and to guard the physician's own well-being).
97. See Ronald M. Epstein et al., Communicating Evidence for Participatory Deci
sion Making, 291 JAMA 2359, 2362 (2004) (reviewing the literature to identify re
search that guides physicians in communicating with their patients about end of
life choices and recommending five communication steps to facilitate good discus
sion between physician and patient); Dale G. Larson & Daniel R. Tobin, End-of-Life
Conversations: Evolving Practice and Theory, 284 JAMA 1573, 1576-77 (2000) (urging
that end of life conversations become a routine part of health care and that ad
vance care planning function as a key aspect of these discussions); Quill, supra note
10, at 2503 (explaining that "[t]imely, sensitive discussions with seriously ill pa
tients regarding medical, psychosocial, and spiritual needs at the end of life are
both an obligation of and privilege for every physician.").
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care are too frequently delayed. Perhaps most significantly, health
care providers express frustration and even anguish that they do not
have the time to spend with patients to address their patients' feelings
99
of shock, depression, or helplessness. Thus, encouraging physicians
to talk with patients (even younger adult patients) about end of life
matters can help to make this process a routine aspect of general and
preventive health care and, in fact, is explicitly encouraged by the
100
American Medical Association.
Somewhat paradoxically, however,
101
physicians appear resistant to such recommendations.
Moreover, medical education should teach new physicians clear
ly and unequivocally that medical care is not necessarily always about
prolonging life. The common training of physicians focuses on
fighting disease, remaining detached, continuing to search for a solu
tion to a problem, but perhaps at the cost of also losing sight of the pa

98. See Quill, supra note 10, at 2503-04 (providing a list of clinical indications
for discussing end of life care, including imminent death, talk about wanting to
die, inquiries about hospice, recent hospitalization for severe progressive illness,
severe suffering, discussing prognosis, discussing treatment with low probability
of success, discussing hopes and fears, and in cases where the physician would not
be surprised if the patient died within six to twelve months). These indications for
initiating end of life discussions, while useful, are primarily reactive to imminent
death, not proactive in any way that would assist a person with coming to terms
with mortality while still healthy.
99. See Charles J. Sabatino, Reflections on the Meaning of Care, 6 NURSING
ETHICS 374, 374-76 (1999) (explaining that the dramatic growth of technologies in
medical care creates a danger "that care will lose its primary focus on the well
being of the whole person").
100. As one commentator has noted, "discussing palliative care issues while
disease-remitting treatments are continued without creating a perception of aban
donment requires the utmost empathy and skill." See Larson & Tobin, supra note
97, at 1575. Why not discuss while the patient is well, as part of primary and pre
ventive care? In fact, these authors recommend precisely that. See id. at 1576. En
couraging patients to discuss preferences is already happening, but does not ap
pear to have had widespread effect. See Opinion 8.081 - Surrogate Decision Making,
AM. MED. Ass'N, http:/ /www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/
medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion8081.page (last visited Mar. 26, 2013)
("Physicians should encourage their patients to document their treatment prefer
ences or to appoint a health care proxy with whom they can discuss their values
regarding health care and treatment in advance. Because documented advance
directives are often not available in emergency situations, physicians should em
phasize to patients the importance of discussing treatment preferences with indi
viduals who are likely to act as their surrogates.").
101. See Nancy L. Keating et al., Physician Factors Associated With Discussions
About End-of-Life Care, 116 CANCER 998, 1001 (2010) (concluding that most physi
cians surveyed indicated that they would not discuss end of life decisions and
choices with terminally ill patients until they exhibited symptoms or there are no
remaining treatments available).

NUMBER 1

PREPARING FOR DEATH

29

102

tient and her goals as an individual.
By reorienting the notion of
caring to include the possibility of stopping therapeutic care and fo
cusing on the alleviation of suffering, young physicians in training can
learn to rein in their technological imperative impulses and offer the
103
patient other sorts of care to ease the dying process.
Unfortunately,
physicians who care for dying patients quite frequently experience re
sistance from patients' families or their own colleagues when they
recommend withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining care-such
recommendations often are referred to as "euthanasia," "killing," or
104
"murder."
This society has endorsed the idea that it is acceptable, even de
sirable, to suppress the fear of death rather than confronting it, to take
massive measures to fight death, even to deny its inevitability. The
instinctive desire of physicians, patients, and families to "do every
thing possible" comports with this broader cultural attitude. This
perspective perpetuates the belief that maximal utilization of life
105
prolonging measures constitutes "good health care."
Although the
attitude among health care providers is shifting, not long ago it was
common to interpret good care as demanding every available, rele
106
vant treatment.
Now, more voices are speaking against the uncriti

102. See generally Symposium, Patient-Centered Law and Ethics, 45 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 1427 (2010) (contaiillng multiple articles that address the value of provid

ing medical care that places the individual patient at the center of health care de
livery, rather than letting insurance companies, pharmaceutical companies, or
even medical organizations drive).
103. It is important to acknowledge at this point the flaws in the palliative and
hospice system that impact the quality of end of life care, particularly the problems
of access and late referrals, although this matter falls outside the scope of this Arti
cle. In this regard, as with communication with patients about their end of life
preferences, medicine is making significant progress.
104. See Nathan E. Goldstein et al., Prevalence of Formal Accusations of Murder
and Euthanasia Against Physicians, 15 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 334, 334-39 (2012) (finding
that more than half of physicians surveyed had their recommendations character
ized as euthanasia, murder, or killing within the previous five years and that 4% of
physicians surveyed reported being formally investigated for hastening a patient's
death when using aggressive pain management techniques and discontinuing ven
tilator support).
105. Cf. Albert R. Jonsen, The God Squad and the Origins of Transplantation Ethics
and Policy, 35 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 238, 239 (2007) ("The problem that looms behind
transplantation medicine is the incessant desire, or rather, demand, that life must
be salvaged at all costs.").
106. See id. at 377 (adding that it is not unusual to "offer a great deal of expen
sive care trying to put off the inevitability of death, even when it may be in vain to
continue doing so.").

30

The Elder Law Journal

VOLUME21

cal presumption in favor of utilizing medical teclmology simply be
107
cause it is available.

V. Conclusion
There is a fundamental difference between acknowledging futile
treatment and advocating euthanasia, abandoning effective medical
treatments for serious illness, or any other dire interpretation that
alarmists might ascribe to the reflections on law and dying in this es
say. It is difficult to imagine a downside to educating individuals
about their rights and choices, including their right to refuse unwant
ed medical treatment. It is also essential to ensure that choices really
do exist and that individual preference is respected, the more so in
situations where care givers, institutions, family members, and even
politicians or religious leaders are attempting to hijack individual
choice. Thinking about and discussing end of life choices explicitly
while there is still healthy life ahead can reduce the incidence of end
of life conflicts and family anguish about stopping treatment and fos
ter a culture of respect for individual choice. Reforming the law rep
resents only a small step towards helping individuals make peace
with death. Meanwhile, modern medicine, longer life spans, and life
sustaining teclmology make it possible to postpone end of life deci
sion-making.
Acknowledging and embracing mortality is not a tragedy-it is a
life-long opportunity. It is impossible to develop any collective ma
joritarian default position on how to deal with death on an individual
level. When an individual decides for herself how to live right, and
moves forward with the assurance that she is living well, she can let
go of the fear of death. Making peace with how one lives-in prepa
ration for how one dies-should be an ongoing process, an opportuni
107. As Daniel Callahan has so ably argued, medical research should focus on
reducing morbidity in the final years of life and assuring that people receive excel
lent care as they die in order to reduce suffering. Daniel Callahan, supra note 86, at
655-56; see also DANIEL CALLAHAN, SETTING LIMITS: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING
SOCIETY 53-58 (1987); DANIEL CALLAHAN, TAMING THE BELOVED BEAST 152-55
(2009) (arguing that "death itself, part of our biological nature, ought not to be
seen as the primary target for health care, particularly when most of us now have
the chance to live a full life" and observing that, paradoxically, as our society has
become healthier, we have begun to worry more about health and to spend more
technological resources on maintaining it); see also James F. Fries, Aging, Natural
Death, and the Compression of Morbidity, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 130, 130-31 (1980)
(discussing the goal of "[e]xtension of adult vigor far into a fixed life span [in order
to] compress[] the period of senescence near the end of life.").
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ty to be seized rather than postponed. This is not a novel observation.
H.L. Mencken, in a letter to the woman whom he later married, ar
gued that it is better to acknowledge the sorrows of life (including the
inevitability of death) in order to savor its joys. Mencken advocates
cynicism as "the most comforting of philosophies. You will get over
your present difficulties only to run into something worse, and so on,
until the last sad scene. Make up your mind to it-and then make the
best of it. . . . Biological necessities keep us going. It is the feeling of
exerting effort that exhilarates us, as a grasshopper is exhilarated by
jumping. A hard job, full of impediments, is thus more satisfying than
. b ."108
an easy JO
Obviously, there are no simple solutions to the problems de
scribed here. Perhaps, at a societal level, these problems are insuper
able. Individuals can, however, take responsibility for that moment
109
which, when it comes, is ours alone to face.
In this sense, even ad
vance care planning creates a false sense of control over the inevitabil
ity of death, because it addresses (and more often in theory than in
practice) the externalities of dying, not the feelings of the individual
approaching death. Finding ways to live beyond the daily activities
necessary to sustain our bodies, and beyond simply seeking distrac
tion, provides a sense of purpose. Much of what we experience at the
end of our lives is within our exclusive control-our inner lives re
main ours alone. As for our outer lives-specifically our bodies and
what we may suffer-taking some control over this aspect of dying
requires an initial willingness to confront what lies within, and to
make use of the law when it promotes our interests and those of the
ones we love.

108. Letter from H.L. Mencken to Sara P. Haardt (later his wife) while she was
in a sanatorium receiving treatment for tuberculosis; quoted in Jacob A. Stein, A
Book on the Bus, WASHINGTON LAWYER, Sept. 2008, http:/ /www.dcbar.org/for
_lawyers I resources I publications I washington_lawyer I september_2008 I spectator
.cfm.
109. In the words of Ivan Illich, "[t]he ordinary person suffers from the inabil
ity to die .... Today, it is not sophisticated terminal treatment but lifelong training
in misplaced concreteness that is the major obstacle to a bittersweet acceptance of
our precarious existence and subsequent readiness to prepare for our own death."
lllich, supra note 1, at 1653.

